Introduction
When the British Medical Association (BMA) set up a committee on nutrition in 1947, this was not the first time they had entered this field. In 1933, at a time of concern about the adequacy of the diets of the poor and unemployed, the Association had appointed a committee to enquire into the minimum cost of an adequate diet. This had been the subject of a report produced by the weekly magazine Week-End Review,I which was part of a wider debate about whether sections of the population were underfed and suffering from malnutrition. At this time, there were growing demands for greater government intervention in the food system to ensure everyone obtained an adequate diet.2 According to Peter Bartrip, the BMA began to take an interest in this field because medical practitioners wanted to forestall being excluded from a burgeoning area of knowledge by the agricultural and educational lobbies.3 David Smith has examined the earlier BMA Nutrition Committee and its conflict with the Ministry of Health's Advisory Committee on Nutrition during 1933-4 over protein and energy standards. He showed that the standards published in 1934 after negotiations between representatives of the two sides may be seen as a compromise between competing experts who were agreed that failure to reach consensus would lead to renewed and damaging public and political controversy. 4 The current paper analyses some of the interactions between a further set of experts convened by the BMA in a different context, leading to the publication of a report on nutrition in 1950.5 In contrast to the situation in the 1930s, the second committee was Conflict and Compromise in the BMA Nutrition Committee 1947 -1950 journals, including the British Medical Journal (BMJ).9 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, in Austerity in Britain, includes an account of the debate about the nutritional adequacy of the British diet immediately preceding the establishment ofthe BMA Nutrition Committee. She draws attention to Dr Franklin Bicknell's article 'Dying England' in the May 1947 number of the independent weekly medical journal the Medical Press. She shows, for example, that Bicknell's arguments were deployed by Lord Woolton, the Conservative party chairman and wartime Minister of Food, in debates and speeches.'0 Bicknell had co-authored a successful book, The vitamins in medicine, reviewing knowledge on the use of vitamins in clinical practice.'1 His Medical Press article, however, was altogether different in character, and began with the statement "England is dying from starvation". He claimed that all the food available, rationed and unrationed, was insufficient for the needs of the population and that therefore, "everyone in England is suffering from prolonged chronic malnutrition". He remarked that a survey conducted in 1933 showed that unemployed men and their wives had been better off then than the general population was now, fourteen years later. After four-and-a-half pages of polemic, he ended with "Once we were a great, a prosperous, a happy nation: once we were well fed" .12
The editorial in the same issue of Medical Press supported Bicknell's article and described it as a response to a grossly misleading paper on 'Rations and nutritional needs' which had appeared in the BMJ in April. The authors were the Ministry of Health experts Drs E R Bransby and H E Magee, who concluded that filling the gap between the food provided by rationed and controlled foods and requirements "should present no difficulty for the great mass of the population".'3 But the BMJ, like the Medical Press, was also sceptical about Bransby and Magee's arguments, even suggesting that they were "out of touch with realities". The BMJ also claimed that the Ministry of Food was failing to reveal food consumption data that could give a more accurate view of the situation."4 Against this background, the idea of establishing a BMA Nutrition Committee appears to have arisen partly as a result of the BMA's public relations problems. The BMA Council's annual report 1946-7 observed that, in contrast to the negative press comments on the Association's opposition to the National Health Service (NHS), the Council's protests over food problems had been well received. One such issue concerned the Ministry of Food overriding doctors' prescriptions for extra rations for the disabled.'5 At the time ofthe preparation of the annual report, however, BMA representatives were engaged in discussions with the Minister of Health with the aim of winning favourable conditions of employment under the NHS. In view ofthese negotiations, this was deemed a "period unsuitable for intensive medico-political publicity", and the public relations officer, John Pringle, was instructed to "develop long-term plans for encouraging a better understanding ... of the 9For some examples of editorials see Br. med. J., 12F Bicknell, 'Special article: dying England', 1945, ii: 573, 852-4; 1946, i: 840-1; 1947, i: 534-5; Medical Press, 1947 , 217: 381-5, pp. 381, 385. 1947 1948, i: 398-9;  13'The hungry sheep.. . ', Medical Press, 1947 , 1948 101 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: 14 'Bread rationing and calories ', Br. med. J., 1947 , rationing, controls, and consumption, 1939 -1955 , i: 534-5. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000 '5'Food rations for invalids: correspondence 1 " F Bicknell and F Prescott, The vitamins in between the Secretary of the BMA and the Ministry of medicine, London, Heinemann Medical, 1942 Food', Br. med. J., 1947 , i: 230-1. (2nd ed. 1946 four meetings before establishing a drafting subcommittee, to which they were not appointed. The subcommittee had very quickly become dependent upon government data, especially from the surveys of the Ministry of Food's statistics and intelligence division, of which Fenelon was director. In view of their control of the data, the officials were much more than "observers". They also made up half the membership of the drafting subcommittee and took much of the responsibility for the preparation of the draft report.42 There is no evidence of Yates being able to deploy his statistical expertise, for which he had been supposedly appointed, and no evidence of Yudkin making significant contributions to the work of the subcommittee.
When the full Committee met in December 1948, it discussed reports of all four subcommittees. During this meeting there were signs ofa desire by Yudkin to intervene in areas beyond the business of his own subcommittee. He spoke up during the discussion of the report on "practical dietetics". Yudkin expressed the view that this tended to echo the "complaints of the well-to-do section of the community and ignored the fact that the great bulk of the population was in a better position in respect of food supplies than ever before". Marrack and le Gros Clark sympathized with this view, but the general feeling was that there was dissatisfaction among all social classes that should not be ignored. The alignment of Yudkin with two members with known left-wing associations, in defending the progress that had been made in sharing food supplies among the population, indicates his egalitarian sentiments, which were also to become evident during the protein dispute. At Cuthbertson reviewed approaches to the study of protein requirements that employed feeding experiments. These involved either nitrogen balance experiments or tests of physiological efficiency and the maintenance ofhealth on low-protein diets, or the estimation of endogenous nitrogen excretion and the nitrogen required for growth and milk production. But the calculations and safety margins applied to the data generated by such experiments were influenced by a desire to bring the requirements up to the level of customary intakes. These points made, he suggested that rather than rely upon experiments, "it is much safer to view our allowance in terms of the dietary habits of the best nourished section of the community and to pay particular regard to the proportion of the total calories derived from protein. This gives us a measure of protein allowance which is safe".50
Having introduced the idea of the protein allowance as a percentage of calories, the memorandum admitted that since people tended to eat more or less of a mixed diet to satisfy ofcalories derived from protein was a departure from customary practice". Drummond was absent from the meeting, but it was decided to invite him to expand the paragraphs on protein in order to take account of the discussion that had taken place.56
Conflict and Consensus It was almost a month before Angus Macrae, the BMA assistant secretary, began to sort out the protein problem. He told Drummond that his absence from the meeting had been "disastrous". Macrae was not sure that he had grasped the point of all that was said but was "very annoyed about the whole business". Although the Committee was not working with the same sense of urgency as the BMA/Advisory Committee on Nutrition conferences of 1934, its work could not be allowed to continue indefinitely, and Macrae was alarmed that his hope of getting the report into print for the May meeting of the Council had been dashed.57 Macrae told Horder that he had taken "a long time to recover my equanimity after that dreadful seven hours meeting". He was especially annoyed about the attack on the protein paragraphs because they had been accepted at the December 1948 meeting.58
Macrae now asked Yudkin and Yates to write to Drummond to explain their position. Yudkin told Drummond that he and Yates were "concerned first about the general principle of relating requirements of protein to dietary habits", which he thought might lead to "trouble". Since better-off people ate more proteins than those less well-off, he asked, "Is it not possible that it will be argued that we should aim at a consumption for all groups equal to that of the highest group?" Secondly, if protein requirements were expressed as a percentage of calorie intake this would contradict the generally held view that "the protein requirements of a normal adult are independent of calories". After a campaign for special treatment, extra allowances of animal foods had been made available for coal miners in 1946,59 but this had been said to be based upon dietary rather than nutritional considerations and was justified by the particular working conditions in mining. The Labour government could be faced with further political difficulties, and discontent among their traditional supporters, if the BMA Committee were now to "definitely relate proteins to Calories". Yudkin envisaged "an increased demand from various groups of workers for increases in meat and cheese rations". In Yudkin's view, the more usual and acceptable way of expressing protein requirements was to give a certain weight of protein needed per unit of body weight. If the Committee was to depart from this approach a detailed explanation of the reasons should be given.60
Yates' concerns were similar, but he emphasized the consequence of the "percentage of calories" approach for those with a low energy expenditure:
... an adult male with a requirement of 2200 calories ... of which 10% is in the form of protein will have an intake of ... 54 gm. of protein per day. Whereas an adult with an energy intake of 4500 calories ... per day will have an intake of 110 gm. per day. While the latter intake ... may be considered adequate, the former will be regarded as definitely low. No adjustment of the percentage will overcome this difficulty ...61 Yates' conclusions were based upon a commonly quoted estimate of adult protein requirements in the region of 100 g of protein per day. In this light, Yates thought, "it would be dangerous-and not prudent-to view the matter in the light of the dietary habits of the community without having careful regard to the individuals in that community". He favoured the reinstatement of some definite allowance along the lines he had indicated. He further argued that the existing paragraphs gave a misleading impression as they did not take into account the fact that some plant proteins do not provide "an even distribution of amino acids". He Before the war and between the years 1940 and 1946, when growth and health were well sustained, the total energy derived from protein generally lay between 10 and 14 per cent.; and before 1939, whenever economic circumstance permitted, the intake of protein of animal origin was raised to the region of 60 per cent. of the total protein.
The figures of 10 per cent of energy for adults other than pregnant and nursing women, and 14 per cent for the latter and infants, children and adolescents remained, but it was also pointed out that "ifhard work is done the protein intake will in fact be increased, but the need for such an increase has not been established."68
The There is no evidence that Drummond's re-draft caused any further difficulties, but a key paragraph, as published, was effectively a dismissal of one of the main planks of Yudkin's and Yates' arguments. The paragraph explained that in the opinion of the Committee it was undesirable for "a misleading impression of precision and finality" to be given by "endorsing such figures as the widely used 1 gram of protein per kilogram of adult body weight". The Committee therefore decided to employ ... an alternative approach ... by considering protein intakes in relation to calorie intakes. At first sight, this may appear a retrograde step, but it will be found to have much to recommend it if it is considered in the light of the lack of precise knowledge of human protein requirements, the quality of the mixture of proteins provided by the food and eaten by the people of the United Kingdom, and the record of food consumption in its relation to national health and welfare during the past ten years.71
In contrast, the achievement of agreement between Sinclair and Cuthbertson did prove difficult. The issue at stake was the figure which would appear as the Committee's recommended allowance for the bulk of the population. Cuthbertson thought that "if our dietary Conflict and Compromise in the BMA Nutrition Committee 1947-1950 habits continue as they do" then the figure should be 12 g, but "if we revert to the prewar diet; 11 would be better". These remarks anticipated the drop in protein intakes that could be expected once the restrictions on fats and sugars were lifted.72 Sinclair, in contrast, told Drummond that since they were "stating a minimum figure for ordinary adults ('the diet should provide not less protein than')" then the figure of 10 per cent should be used. This, he calculated, would "give a moderately active man or woman (at 3,000 and 2,500 Cal.) more than the classical 1 g./kg. body-weight". On the other hand, if " 12" was used this would give "even more than the per caput protein consumption of urban working class families as recorded in the last two Family Food Surveys of the Ministry of Food".7 Sinclair later intimated that "Since Cuthbertson is prepared to admit 11% as a compromise" they should settle on that figure deleting the words "not less protein than" in the sentence "the Committee recommends that the diet should provide an amount representing not less protein than 11% of the energy allowance". Apologizing for being "troublesome", he explained:
... my difficulty in this; If the mean protein consumption of the adult population is about 11% it is reasonable to suppose that half of them are eating more and half less than this figure ... The Bicknells [emphasis added] and others will have a hue and cry again about half the population being starved of protein ... Therefore if the Committee should put as a minimum figure one that is about the mean of working class families at the present time, I should like to put a foot-note to say that I disagree with the figure 11 and would prefer 10; but if we can delete the words "not less protein than" and simply put a recommendation I certainly agree with the figure of 11.74
Macrae reported to Horder in early August that a compromise had been reached. Drummond had decided to accept the figure " 11", as it was now "too late to start fresh arguments about the matter". Macrae had sent the report to the printers.75 The final fixing of the formula on protein needs was therefore partly the result of pressure to meet deadlines. The deletion suggested by Sinclair was not made, and Sinclair subsequently sent a note to be inserted in the report. This did not, however, specifically mention the protein figures:
The nutritional allowances adopted by the Committee agree closely with those adopted during the war by the Oxford Nutrition Survey; these were made available to the Committee by Dr Mark W Bufton, David F Smith and Virginia Berridge questions, credibility becomes as important as scientific competence.77 This appears to have been the case with regard to the episode described in this paper. None ofour scientific actors was really sure what to recommend about protein requirements. None was specially competent to settle the question, and the dispute and its settlement became concerned largely with the credibility of alternative formulations. A Mazur subsequently pointed out that on trans-scientific questions experts might reasonably take any one of several positions. He suggested first that "One's interpretation of ambiguous data is often tied to one's position on the innovation about which controversy exists". Interpretations of ambiguous data are often conditioned by broader, quasi-political interests. Second, he proposed that some experts subscribe to a particular interpretation of ambiguous data simply because they are used to that interpretation and have never questioned it. Third, an expert may take one side or another because a friend has taken it. Coalitions may build and solidify and disagreements become polarized.78 The following discussion explores the operation of such factors as credibility, resistance to apparent change and professional and political interests and alliances in the context of this paper.
Credibility was an issue for both the BMA/Advisory Committee on Nutrition conferences in 1934 and the 1947-50 BMA Nutrition Committee, despite the different contexts of the two periods. On both occasions, there appeared to be no question of rejecting the opportunity to publish a statement of protein requirements,79 but, in view of the uncertainty of what these were, the credibility of the statement to be published on protein became a major issue.
On In 1933-4, calorie as well as protein requirements were matters for dispute, and again, part of the argument was about the wisdom of departing from well-established standards. In 1948-9, however, although statements of calorie requirements according to occupation remained points of contention, the frank admission of uncertainty and the need for more research in this area appears to have provided an effective basis for consensus lasting from the committee meeting in December 1948 until the production ofthe report. While the draft paragraphs on protein also expressed the scientific uncertainty surrounding protein requirements, the deployment of reasoning based on custom rather than scientific principles made this a promising area for intervention by committee members intent on intervening. No doubt, challenges could also have been made to the figures placed upon individual vitamin or mineral requirements that might have had some consequences for rationing, but the level of the protein requirement was clearly related to the contentious political question of meat rationing. The possible link between their protein recommendation and rationing was certainly a question in the minds of the disputants.82
What else can be said of the actions and positions taken by the key participants in this dispute over protein requirements? As for Cuthbertson, having declined membership of the committee because he was required by his employees to concentrate upon animal nutrition, he became involved in its work because he was asked to attend a subcommittee meeting and to submit a memorandum, the predominant tone of which was pragmatic. The Committee called upon his advice again later, following Yudkin's and Yates' interventions, and he was subsequently asked to fix the final figures along with Sinclair. There is no evidence that he was unduly concerned about the precise figures and Sinclair's desire to revise the figures slightly downwards. Since he was under pressure not to become involved in human nutrition, it is not surprising that he seemed disinclined to engage in prolonged controversy on this issue.
The position taken by Yudkin-the view that the proposed "percentage of energy" approach would provide a scientifically indefensible excess of protein for high-energy consumers and a shortage for low-energy consumers-may be seen to be in line with an egalitarian impulse discernible in other contexts. These egalitarian sentiments may have translated into a concern that the "percentage of energy" approach could be used as a rationale for socially divisive demands for extra rations, which would undermine the government's "fair shares" policies. From Yudkin's perspective, basing protein 81 H C Sherman, 'Protein requirement of He remembered that in response to the concerns he maintenance in man and the nutritive efficiency of expressed about possible demands for changes in the bread protein ', J. Biol. Chem., 1920, 41: 97-109;  rationing system following from the proposed League of Nations Health Organisation, Report on the protein requirement figures, Harriette Chick asked physiological bases of nutrition, Geneva, 1936. whether he would not like a little more bacon to eat? The origins of the 1 g per kg rule were made clear As a Jew, he had a ready reply. Sinclair's immediate reaction to Yudkin and Yates is clarified by considering his own institutional position. Sinclair's professional ambitions had been shattered when, after the War, he had been unable to mobilize sufficient support and finance to establish a full-scale university nutrition department, and now, with a little external funding he was making do with Nissen hut laboratories. Sinclair had been a key member of the nutritional requirements committee, since for most of the nutrients it was his own scales used by the Oxford Nutrition Survey that had been adopted. This helps to explain the offence caused to Sinclair by Yudkin's and Yates' intervention. However, when it came to settling the figures to be entered in the final report, like Yudkin, Sinclair took into account the potential for the Committee's report being used for agitation purposes by people such as Bicknell. But there is no evidence that Sinclair's position arose from the kind of ideological commitments apparent in Yudkin' s reasoning. Sinclair's remarks about the possible use ofthe report being used as the basis for political agitation appear more as distaste for political engagement. This may also explain why, once a figure slightly higher than the one he favoured was adopted, he then submitted only a very bland note of reservation. This impression is reinforced by Sinclair's attitude towards the informal conferences of nutrition workers that preceded the creation of the Nutrition Society in 1941. These meetings had foundered when Edward Mellanby instructed MRC-supported nutrition workers not to attend after the conferences began to send recommendations to government departments. At this point, John Boyd Orr took the initiative and proposed the formation of a properly constituted scientific society, whereupon Sinclair wrote to Orr commenting that the informal conferences had been useful until they had come to include people more interested in politics than nutrition. He hoped that Orr would institute a "purge" of the group. c.1945-1994 : the case of diet and heart disease', in Smith and Phillips (eds), op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 207-22; M W Bufton, 'Coronary heart disease versus BSE: characterising official British expert advisory committees', Science and Public Policy, 2001, 28: 381-8. 
